Activism and the Electoral Participation of Women*

Mona Morgan-Collins† and Valeria Rueda‡

†King's College London

‡University of Nottingham and CEPR

September 24, 2024

Abstract

Can political activism foster electoral participation? We investigate this question by examining the role of the British suffragists in promoting women's electoral participation. While scholars have shown that women politicians increase women's participation, less attention has been paid to the role of activists. We fill this gap by studying the 1913 Pilgrimage, a large-scale nationwide march in support of women's parliamentary suffrage. Using a novel database of geocoded electoral registers, we employ a Differences-in-Differences strategy to show that proximity to the Pilgrimage increased (eligible) women's registration in local elections. To explain this effect, we show that direct in-person contact with female activists spurred women's political mobilization, that our results are not driven by an endogenous selection of the march path and cannot be attributed to mobilization by other movements or politicians. Our findings highlight that activism can drive political participation even in the virtual absence of women politicians.

Keywords: Women's Suffrage, Suffrage Movement, Political Development, Political Participation

*We would like to thank the following people and for the valuable comments they provided to our paper: Julia Cagé, Matthias Dilling, James Fenske, Diana O'Brien, Jennifer Piscopo, Anna Gwiazda, Barbara Piotrowska, Raluca Pahontu, Devesh Rustagi, Daniel Seidmann, Cecilia Testa, Dario Tortarolo, Ekatherina Zhuravskaya, and participants at the Cage 2022 Economic History Workshop, PolEconUK 2023 workshop, and the Sciences-Po Liepp 2023 "Women in Politics" Workshop; seminar participants at City University London, KCL, and the Universities of Essex, Oxford and York; and participants at APSA, CES, and NICEP conferences. We would like to thank Anita Braga, Erin Brady, Florencia Buccari, Yifei Chen, Sarah Crowe, Alejandro Pérez-Portocarrero, Ridwan Prasetyo, Emma Rogers, Ahan Thakur, and Marcelo Woo for excellent research assistance; Joseph Day and CAMPOP for sharing British demographic data with us; and the team at the West Yorkshire Archive service in Wakefield for their outstanding support during the pandemic. This project was supported by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant and by the Economic and Social Research Council ES/T01394X/1, 'From Suffrage to Representation.'† mona.morgan-collins@kcl.ac.uk; ‡ valeria.rueda@nottingham.ac.uk

Can political activism foster electoral participation? We investigate this question by examining the role of the British suffragists in promoting electoral participation of other women. While extant research has established the role of women politicians in increasing other women's political participation (e.g. Barnes and Burchard 2013; Beaman et al. 2009; Herrnson et al. 2003; Liu and Banaszak 2017; Reyes-Housholder 2018; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007, 2017), much less is known about the role of women activists. Like politicians, activists advocate for group interests and mobilize through mass campaigns. Unlike politicians, they can be active even when women's de jure access to formal politics is limited. Through the study of a mass-mobilization event organized by the suffragists, we uncover how women's mass campaigning for suffrage facilitated other women's electoral participation.

Women at the turn of the twentieth century faced severe cultural and structural barriers that prevented them to fully engage in formal politics. Women were less likely to vote, join political parties or male-centered associations such as trade unions (Wolbrecht and Corder 2020), which in turn increased politicians' cost to mobilize women (Morgan-Collins 2023). While women politicians can lower the mobilization costs of women voters, traditional attitudes about women kept most women from becoming politicians for decades after suffrage. Women's activism in voluntary associations, on the other hand, did not always challenge traditional gender roles, as women-centered voluntary associations flourished long before women secured equal suffrage.

Building on extant theories of women's networks, role models, and mobilizational strategies, we argue that suffragists' mass campaigning for the vote facilitated other women's political socialization and therefore their propensity to participate in elections. Much like women politicians in the times to come, the suffragists' campaigning spurred women's participation. The Pilgrims activities that engaged the public 'on the ground' provided the opportunity for women to internalize a view of politics as suitable for women, to join a network that advocated for women's political presence and to feel symbolically and substantively represented.

The primary challenge to identifying the effect of activism is that activist networks and campaigning do not emerge randomly. In this paper, we overcome this challenge through the study of the 1913 Suffrage Pilgrimage, a nationwide march in support of women's parliamentary suffrage. The march, organized by non-militant suffragists of the National Union of Women Suffrage Societies (NUWSS), provides an ideal case for two reasons. First, the march encompassed virtually all kinds of in-person campaigning activities, including banner displays, public speeches, membership recruitment, leaflet distribution and media engagement. Second, the march was a one-off event where local and out-of-town suffragists joined forces to reach previously un-contacted places. Leveraging this unique mass event, we can credibly isolate the effect of various types of campaigning on electoral participation of women eligible to vote in local elections.

To measure women's registration before and after the event, we leverage the yearly electoral registers for the period 1911-14 in two novel ways. First, we collect individual records of registration for 20,000 individuals in a randomly selected sub-sample of localities. These data provide the most direct measure of participation, but have limited geographic scope. Therefore, we build a second database with aggregate data on the types of electors registered across four large counties broadly representative of England. We measure women's registration as a relative weight of local electors–the only category where women could register–over total electors. We demonstrate the validity of this measure with the individual-level data and a broad range of additional tests.

Employing a canonical Difference-in-Differences strategy, we compare the change in registration before and after the march between localities along the march route and others. We demonstrate that the march significantly increased women's registration using either the individual or division-level data sets. Collecting additional division-level data, we provide additional evidence supporting our argument that direct in-person contact with female activists spurred women's political mobilization. Specifically, we demonstrate that the effects of the march are limited to localities in its close vicinity, that it spurred the opening of new

suffrage (but not anti-suffrage) societies and that it did not mobilize men.

In the remainder of the paper, we address the most significant threats to inference with a large battery of tests. First, we provide evidence that treated marched-on localities did not evolve differently before the march, thus supporting the plausibility of the identifying, parallel trends, assumption. Second, we refute the possibility that marched-on localities experienced changes in registration only at the time of the march, but for reasons other than the Pilgrimage. This could happen if the match path was strategically placed through urban, connected and pro-suffrage places that would have spurred women's registration regardless of the march. However, we do not find any changes along non-marched-on (placebo) main routes, and show that the results hold even when restricting the sample to well-connected locations, and that the results are not driven by urban centres. Third, we probe key alternative explanations about why and how the march could have increased women's participation. We demonstrate that the effects are not driven by pre-existing suffrage, anti-suffrage and strike activity, refuting that our results reflect activities of pre-existing political organization. We also refute that our results are driven by election campaigning, as no significant nation-wide elections were held at that time. Finally, we show robustness to alternative specifications, variable definitions, samples and standard errors.

This paper has implications for women's substantive representation (e.g.Kittilson 2008; O'Brien and Piscopo 2019 on women politicians; Weeks 2022 on gender quotas). To the extent that the quality of substantive representation reflects propensity to participate in elections, our findings imply that women's activism has the potential to improve women's substantive representation even in a context where women politicians are absent.

1 Literature Review: Women Voters, Activists and Politicians

This section reviews three independent literatures on women's political engagement and illustrates how, by integrating them, we contribute to existing debates through the study of suffragists' mass campaigning.

Women politicians as role models. Gender scholarship demonstrates that women politi-

cians stand as role models to other women and therefore pave the way for other women's political engagement (Barnes and Burchard 2013; Beaman et al. 2009; Karp and Banducci 2008; Desposato and Norrander 2009; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007; but also see Clayton 2015 and Liu 2018). Being more 'similar' to women voters, women politicians are more likely to ignite feelings of being effectively represented (Barnes and Burchard 2013), spark political interests by bringing new issues and frames (Atkeson, 2003; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2017) and by demonstrating that politics is 'not just a men's game' (Liu and Banaszak 2017). However, it remains unclear whether women activists can also spark women's interest in politics by serving as role models.

Women politicians as agents of women's political mobilization. Another strand of gender scholarship suggests that women politicians can mobilize women into politics more effectively than men. They can better rely on support of women's groups, better tap into women's networks of voters and co-partisans, and more credibly advocate for women (Goyal 2021; Reyes-Housholder 2018). Whilst 'gendering' electoral and intra-party campaigns strategies is often necessary to comply with public expectations (Herrnson et al. 2003; Franceschet et al. 2016), women who run on 'women's issues' and mobilize women into parties have enjoyed greater career, electoral and fundraising success (Goyal 2021; Thomsen and Swers 2017; Schaffner 2005). However, it remains unclear whether women activists can also mobilize women by better tapping into women's networks, or even help to 'create' those networks, and conveying more credible advocacy for women.

Women voters at the time of suffrage. Recent gender scholarship uncovers the importance of institutional and electoral context for electoral participation of the first women voters (Corder and Wolbrecht 2006, 2016 on registration and competition; Kim 2019 on direct democracy; Morgan-Collins 2023 on competition; Skorge 2023 on proportional representation). Scholars typically attribute these effects to politicians' incentives to mobilize women, but strong social networks also further politicians' incentives to mobilize women. Namely, the suffrage movement incentivized politicians to mobilize women by increasing the effi-

ciency of their campaigns through suffragists' networks (Skorge 2023; Teele 2018). However, it remains unclear whether the suffragists' broad range of modern mass campaigning strategies (beyond petitioning already thriving in the 19th century, see Carpenter et al. 2018) shaped women's politicization regardless of politicians' incentives to mobilize them.

2 Historical Background: The 1913 Pilgrimage

The 1913 Pilgrimage was organized by the The National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies (NUWSS). The NUWSS was the largest suffrage organization, reaching 496 affiliated societies and more than 50,000 paying women and men members by 1914 (Pugh 2000, p. 254). The NUWSS law-abiding tactics contrasted with the militant campaign of the Women Social and Political Union (WSPU) (Hume 2016).

The Pilgrimage was to be a 'giant advertisement', a live demonstration of widespread solidarity with the non-militant constitutional women's suffrage movement that would pressure the government (Crawford 2001, p.549). Great deal of attention was devoted to projecting a united and confident 'brand'. The Common Cuase (June 13 and 20, 1913) asked the Pilgrims were asked to showcase the colors of the society in their hat and sash ribbons, recommended shades of dress (black, white, grey, or navy blue) that would make the colors of the ribbons more salient. A special badge for the event was also designed, and a specific song was written and distributed in advance.

The suffragists marched along several routes in England and Wales for six weeks in June and July 1913. The pilgrims travelled up to 10-20 miles a day in any weather, most joining for part of the journey. The Pilgrims were thus a mix of suffragists from far away and relatively nearby locations. Most travelled on foot, but caravans, horseback and bicycles were also common (Robinson 2018). They carried banners, sold the suffragists newspaper, distributed leaflets, placed adverts in local newspapers, held open-air and indoor meetings and attended teas organized by local sympathizers (Crawford 2001, p.550-3; Cartwright 2013, p.180-1). The march culminated in a demonstration in Hyde Park held for 70,000 spectators (Pugh 2000, p. 279), with the Common Cause (August 18, 1913) estimating overall collec-

tions reaching an impressive £8,325 - £3.4 (5) million in terms of labour (income) value in 2021.

In the end, the Pilgrimage was a 'huge but orderly' demonstration, significant enough for Prime Minister Asquith to consent to meet a delegation of suffragists after the event (Pugh 2000, p. 279). The Pilgrimage also marked the beginning of a stark shift of the NWUSS away from lobbying and petitioning of the Parliament to 'public' tactics that sought to mobilize women into the movement. This shift also brought NUWSS closer to working-class women, as they engaged with working-class women's issues and forged an electoral alliance with Labour (Van Wingerden 1999, p.145-8).

3 Theory: How Suffragists Facilitated Participation

We argue that suffragists campaigning activities along the march helped the already enfranchised women to break through barriers to political socialization. Through mass in-person recruitment, information and mobilization activities along the route, the suffragists facilitated women's presence in the public sphere, and ultimately, women's participation in elections. Specifically, we identify three such pathways: demonstrating that politics is for women, mobilizing women to demand access to formal politics and claiming to symbolically and substantively represent women.

[1] The Suffragists Demonstrated that Politics Was for Women. We argue that the suffragists' mass campaigning demonstrated to other women that women belong to the public sphere. The anti-suffragists often questioned women's political abilities and casted the suffragists as a non-representative minority of women (Grimshaw, 1987; Pugh, 2000). However, the mass campaigning activities of the suffragists effectively transformed them into the prototypes of the 'new' political woman, role models for other women. In their campaigning, the suffragists demonstrated that women had political skills, which facilitated other women's political socialization. Much like women politicians in the future, the suffragists demonstrated that politics was not just a men's field.

This was especially the case in the context of the Pilgrimage. Campaigning for the vote

along the route, the Pilgrims demonstrated that women had political skills as orators, organizers and campaigners and that they could withstand harsh political opposition. The Pilgrimage was perceived as a means to demonstrating women's political skills and devotion, whilst the 'Pilgrimage' term itself served the suffragists aim to redefine what woman could be outside the home - like spiritual Pilgrims, these women have *'left homes'* to *'save [own] souls by serving others'*.[1] Anytime boisterous mobs of young men render speeches unintelligible or violently attacked the Pilgrims[2].[3], women have demonstrated that they can withstand even in the harshest of political environments.

[2] The Suffragists Mobilized Women to Support Women's Active Role in Politics. We argue that the suffragists' efforts to mobilize other women into the movement fostered women's participation in the public sphere. Much like women politicians in the years to come, the suffragists facilitated women's political socialization through effective campaigning and the expansion of the organization's network. The suffragists typically organized public speeches and meetings, petitions, protest demonstrations, parades and marches and sometimes even engaged in militant activism (Banaszak 1996; Graham 1996). Whenever the suffragists reached out to women, they mobilized women to support an inherently political cause, providing a first step towards greater engagement in politics.

The Pilgrimage, especially, was a prime tool of political mobilization. Encouraging women to join local suffrage societies, donate to its political cause and take part in meetings along the route, the suffragists sought to mobilize women to demand access to formal politics, and in doing so, to participate in the public sphere. Paraphrasing Millicent Fawcett, the main goal of the Pilgrimage was to demonstrate *'the great strength of the nonmilitant movement'* and to solicit support for suffrage by *'awaken[ing] the imagination of the unimaginative'*.[4] The propaganda work of suffragists carried out along the route was immensely successful, with over half a million leaflets distributed[**??**] and meetings along the route typically attracting hundreds and sometimes even thousands of locals.[6], [7]

[3] The Suffragists Positioned Themselves as Better Representatives of Women. We

argue that the suffragists campaigning mobilized some women by creating narratives that the suffragists symbolically and substantively represented women. Much like women politicians today, the suffragists facilitated women's political socialization by positioning themselves as speakers on behalf of women. Whenever the suffragists called for suffrage to protect a particular interest of women (Kraditor, 1965; McConnaughy 2013), they stood as advocates for policies that they defined to be of special interest to women. Regardless of the actual support for such policies among women, the suffragists gained leverage among some women by claiming to represent women more effectively than men.

The Pilgrimage especially provided a powerful platform for voicing pro-suffrage arguments, and placing the suffragists as better advocates for women. The Pilgrims regularly engaged with local audiences in heated discussions on suffrage, often highlighting the injustice of excluding tax-paying women from having a say in politics, but also voicing the commitment to improving conditions for the poorest of women.[8], [9] Suffragists' speeches were often followed by questions from the audience or private discussions after the meetings[10], which forced the Pilgrims to engage with arguments against suffrage based on women's natural domesticity.[11]. Addressing anti-suffragists rhetoric, the Pilgrims responded by highlighting the importance of the Vote to protect out their family-centered interests[12], positioning themselves as better advocates of women.

4 Case Selection and Data Sets

In testing our theoretical framework, we seek to establish whether the march for parliamentary suffrage spurred electoral registration of (mostly tax-paying) enfranchised women in local elections.[1] We collect four consecutive years of electoral registers (1911-1914), which list registered electors for all elections that took place each year. The registers are finalized in the fall of a preceding year. This means that 1911, 1912 and 1913 registers were finalized before the march, and the 1914 register was finalized after the march. Therefore, the 1914

[1]Women and men who paid rent or owned property above a threshold value were enfranchised, with tighter restrictions placed on married women who could not register on the same property as husbands. By 1900, over one million of women could vote. Detailed description of eligibility in Appendix Section A.

post-march register captures the immediate effects of the march within few months of the march. This decreases the probability that our results are driven by other concurring events, although it likely underestimates the overall effects.

We use the yearly electoral registers in two ways. First, we collect individual-level records naming each elector. This approach provides the most direct measure of women's registration, but the high collection cost inevitably limits the number of locations in the sample.[2] The limited number of divisions restricts our ability to strengthen not only generalizability, but also internal validity by restricting examination of inference threats arising from location-specific factors such as urbanization and society presence. We therefore collect a complementary database extracted from the summary pages that provide the number of electors in each category in the division: those qualified as parliamentary and local electors, parliamentary electors only, and local electors only. Since women could only be local electors, we proxy for women's changes in registration trends at the division level with the change in the share of local electors over total electors in the division. These data cover a larger number of locations, thus addressing limitations from the individual-level data.

The individual-level dataset covers 20 parishes in the West Riding of Yorkshire (WRY) for years 1911 and 1914, totaling 20k individual records, 4k of which are local electors only. The WRY has the advantage of being a large county with a significant coverage of the march, and of presenting smaller geographical units (parishes) which improves the cost-efficiency of collecting more localities. In this county, we randomly select 'treated' locations along the march path and 'control' ones along main (Roman) roads linking York to Manchester. This is intended to improve comparability between treatment and control, as both sets of locations are connected to urban centers. This individual-level data set allows us to estimate the effects of march on women's registration most accurately and to validate the accuracy of our division-level proxy for women's registration.

The division-level dataset covers the summary pages in the electoral records in four

[2] Automatizing the collection of these records using a web-scraper is not authorized by the owners of the digital historical records. Further details in Appendix Section C.

counties, for four consecutive years (1911-1914). The four counties include Gloucestershire, Norfolk, Surrey and the West Riding of Yorkshire, and altogether total about 14% of English population, 19% of eligible electorate in 1910 and represent distinct electoral and occupational contexts (see further description of each county in Appendix Table B.1). These division-level data allows us to strengthen generalizability to four counties that are broadly representative of England and to strengthen internal validity through several division-level robustness tests ruling out threats to inference and alternative mechanisms.

5 Variables

We now turn to explaining our dependent and independent variables. Appendix section C provides more details on sources and collection procedures.

Electoral Registration. In order to measure women's electoral participation, we study electoral registration of women who were already eligible to vote in local elections.[3] In the individual-level data set, we measure women's registration with a binary indicator of a local elector being a woman. Focusing on a sub-sample of roughly 4k local electors, the only category that welcomed women. In the division-level data set, we proxy women's registration as a share of local electors - the only category of electors where women could register - over the total number of electors (local only, parliamentary only, local and parliamentary) at the polling division level. That is, we utilize a proportion measure of women's registration that captures the weight of the only category that allowed women compared to the overall mass of registered electors.[4]

[3]We focus on registration (not turnout), a key bottleneck to electoral participation (Braconnier et al. 2017). Importantly, local elections (outside of few exceptions) were held in 1910 and then only in 1918 due to war-related postponement of elections. A substantial time gap with a war event in middle would pose a threat to our inference (as opposed to yearly registration between 1911 and 1914).

[4]Increase in a proportion measure may not always indicate narrowing of percentage point differences in low-turnout context, given that politicians strategically target electors with the lowest cost of voting irrespective of gender (Morgan-Collins 2024). However, we focus on registration outside of an electoral period, thus largely independent of electoral incentives. Moreover, the suffragists did not mobilize irrespective of gender, but increased political socialization of women as a 'byproduct' of their campaigning. Another way of think-

Figure 1: Map of the March and Data Availability at the Division-Level



Notes: *March path in sampled counties is along main roads connecting stopping points and along straight lines outside sample* (*see Appendix Figure C.1 for stopping points*).

March Path. Our independent variable captures proximity to the march. To construct it, we recover the names of all cities and towns scheduled for visit by the NUWSS from an original map (Appendix Figure C.1). We establish the path between those cities using the main historical roads connecting these locations. Our preferred definition of 'treated' divisions intersected by the march is within 1km of Euclidean distance from the centroid of the division to the closest point of the march. This range captures localities where people most certainly experienced the march in person. In total, our individual-level sample identifies 10 divisions intersected by the march and 10 control divisions outside the path 1km range. Our division-level sample contains 62 divisions intersected by the march, and 968 divisions that were not intersected within 1km. Figure 1 and Appendix Figure 1 presents the path of the march and marks the four selected counties and treated divisions. Appendix Figure C.2

then zooms on the parishes that were randomly selected for the individual-level analysis.

Control Variables. We include a battery of division-level control variables in both individual and division-level analyses. We use data from 1911 census to indicate demographic characteristics of polling divisions, including population and age by gender, indicators on fertility, marriage, and child mortality. We also account for socio-economic structure of the population, namely the share of male population belonging to five out of six social class categories defined by the standard historical international social class scheme (HISCLASS). Finally, we account for distance to the nearest city and a distance to a nearest main road.

Summary Statistics. Table 1 compares treated and control divisions. In the individual-level data set, the share of local electors (the only category where women were eligible to register) before the march took place was 23 percentage points in the control group and 13 percentage points in the treated group. The average total electorate size is roughly twice as large in the control group than in the marched-on divisions. These differences reflect the fact that the control group in the individual-level data set was drawn from along main roads orthogonal to the march path. The share of women among local electors is high as expected, 60% or higher in the treatment group.

In the division-level data set, the share of local electors before the march took place is nearly identical to the one observed in the individual-level sample in the treatment group, but roughly one standard deviations lower than in the individual-level data set in the control group. The marched-on divisions' average total electorate size is twice as large as that of those outside the path, reflecting higher concentration of propertied men eligible to vote in urban locations along the march path compared to the control group.

The summary statistics on control variables in the four sampled counties are also consistent with the expectation that the suffragists marched through urban and connected places (Appendix Table C.1). Across the four sampled counties, divisions intersected by the march

ing about this is that the suffragists campaigning lowered the costs of women's registration (not men's), thus narrowing down percentage point gaps in participation. This is consistent with us demonstrating below that the march did not affect men's registration levels.

Table 1: Summary Statistics - Individual and Division-Level Analysis

	Outside Path		On March Path			
	Mean	Sd	Mean	Sd	Diff (1)-(3)	P-Val
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA						
Electoral Registration Measures 1911:						
Total Electors (100)	6.91	9.42	3.09	3.6	-3.82	0.22
Number of Women	90.73	123.03	35.43	31.26	-55.3	0.27
Share Local over Total Electors	0.23	0.04	0.13	0.06	-0.09	0
Electoral Registration Measures, 1914:						
Total Electors (100)	6.99	9.64	3.17	3.79	-3.83	0.29
Number of Women	91.27	123.74	36.86	31.05	-54.42	0.28
Share Local over Total Electors	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.06	-0.08	0
No of Locations	10		10			
DIVISION-LEVEL DATA						
Electoral Registration Measures, pre-1913:						
Total Electors (100)	6.224	18.162	13.327	18.162	-7.103	0
Local Electors (100)	0.968	1.942	1.497	1.942	-0.529	0.006
Share Local over Total Electors	0.163	0.056	0.135	0.056	0.027	0.129
Electoral Registration Measures, post-1913:						
Total Electors (100)	6.709	18.238	12.506	18.238	-5.797	0
Local Electors (100)	1.042	2.069	1.631	2.069	-0.589	0.005
Share Local over Total Electors	0.161	0.057	0.148	0.057	0.014	0.487
Observations	968		62			

were on average larger and closer to main roads, with fertility rates being lower, female celibacy rates higher, age at marriage higher, women's share of population higher and share of married women working also higher. In the section below, we highlight how our causal empirical strategy, along with several additional tests, overcomes concerns stemming from these differences in levels before the march.

6 Empirical Strategy

Our goal is to estimate the effect of suffragists' campaigning activities on other women's mobilization. The common estimation challenge is that campaigning is not randomly assigned. Women's mobilization typically enabled the emergence of suffragists networks, and suffragists devoted effort to campaigning in urban and connected places where women were

more likely to be already mobilized and potentially supportive of the cause. Therefore, any correlation between campaigning activities and women's mobilization may capture characteristics of the location such as urbanization or socio-economic characteristics. In this paper, we overcome this challenge in two ways. First, by focusing on one large-scale campaigning event in combination with the use of yearly electoral registers, we can run a differences-in-differences estimation. That is, we can compare the change in trends in women's registrations before and after the event, between marched-on and control localities. The identifying assumption is then that, conditional on controls, trends in these two groups would have been parallel in the absence of the Pilgrimage. Even if marched-on and control locations differed in levels, for instance because these locations are more urbanized, the effect of the march is identified as long as the parallel trends assumption holds. As standard, we probe the validity of the parallel trends assumption by testing pre-trends and with a battery of additional tests. Second, the march was unique in that by connecting urban centers, it brought out-of town suffragists to localities that were not typically within the reach of suffrage campaigning. We can therefore assess the impact of the march outside of urban and pro-suffrage locations.

We run following difference-in-differences specification.[5] The treatment group encompasses all polling districts intersected by the march. The control group consists of all divisions not intersected by the march in the sample. Equation (1)describes our baseline specification, which we estimate using OLS.

$$y_{ktp(k)} = \beta \text{March}_{p(k)} \text{Post}_t + \gamma \text{March}_{p(k)} + \delta \text{Post}_t + \mathbf{X}_p' \gamma_t + \eta_{c(p)} + \varepsilon_{pt}; \quad k \in \{i, p\}. \tag{1}$$

The unit of observation k is either the individual i (individual-level analysis) or the polling division p (division-level analysis), for every year $t \in \{1911 - 14\}$. $\text{March}_{p(k)}$ is a binary variable equal to 1 if polling division p is in the treatment group, defined by its centroid falling within a 1 km buffer of the path. Post_t is a binary variable equal to one for

[5] Similar designs have been recently used by economists to estimate the mobilizing effects of Nazi propaganda (Caprettini et al. 2022) and the 2017 women's march in the U.S. (Larreboure and Gonzales 2021).

the year t after the march, and March$_p$ $\times$ Post$_t$ is the interaction between the two terms. The parameter of interest is β; it captures how the march changed the trends of the outcome after 1913, in marched-on divisions compared to the control group. In the individual level analysis ($k = i$), the outcome $y_{itp(i)}$ is a binary variable flagging if individual i in division $p(i)$ at time t is a woman. In the division-level analysis ($k = p$), the outcome y_{pt} is the share of local electors over the total number of registered electors in division p in year t.

Share Local Voters$_{pt}$, is the share of local voters over the total number of registered electors in a polling division p, in year t (1911-1914). March$_p$ is a binary variable equal to 1 if a polling division p was within 1 km of the path. Post$_t$ is a binary variable equal to one for the year after the march, and March$_p$ $\times$ Post$_t$ is the interaction between the two terms. The parameter of interest is β, which captures how the 1913 march changed the share of local electors in intersected localities. In the individual level data set, we run the same specification except that the dependent variable is measured at the individual level as a binary indicator of whether a registered electors is a woman among local electors.

In all our models, we include a vector of socio-economic, demographic and distance controls $\mathbf{X}_p^{'}$ from 1911 census, as presented in Appendix Table C.1. For more flexible specification, we interact all controls with the Post$_t$ variable. The flexible inclusion of control variables allows us to account for time-varying effects of the controls. In the division-level data set, we also include fixed effects $\eta_{c(p)}$ for all counties c and cluster standard errors at the parliamentary division level.

7 Individual-Level Analysis

In this section, we first present our baseline estimates using individual-level dataset in the randomly selected 20 divisions of West Riding in Yorkshire, and then validate our proxy of women's registration used in the division-level dataset.

Individual-Level Results Table 2 (Models 2,3) presents the baseline estimates from our individual-level analysis. Consistent with our expectations, the march narrowed the difference between women's and men's registration in divisions on and outside of the march

Table 2: Baseline Effects of the March on the Probability of a Female Registered Elector.

	Fem Voter (grow)	Fem Voter (share)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Share Local Electors, Growth	0.922**		
	(0.427)		
DPost X March		0.020	0.037*
		(0.023)	(0.021)
March		0.090	−0.116
		(0.079)	(0.148)
DPost		−0.001	−0.004
		(0.010)	(0.008)
Data Aggregation	District	Individual	Individual
County	WR of Yorkshire	WR of Yorkshire	WR of Yorkshire
Years	1914	1911 & 14	1911 & 14
Controls	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	4.64	0.55	0.55
Sd dep. var.	33.18	0.5	0.5
Observations	18	4,249	4,249
R^2	0.226	0.006	0.038

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01; OLS estimates; unit of observation is polling division in column* (1) *and the individual in columns* (2) *and* (3)*; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level.*

path. Model (3) presents the estimate of interest ($\hat{\beta}$) with full battery of controls. The results show that the probability that a registered local elector is a woman rose significantly by 3.7 percentage points more in marched-on divisions compared to others. The estimates account for about 6.7% of the outcome mean. This is sizable despite only reflecting immediate reactions a few months after the march and the likelihood of attenuation bias from measurement error due to using historical records.

Validating Division-Level Proxy of Women's Registration The estimates presented in Table 2 cover a geographically narrow area, with limited reassurance that these estimates are internally valid. We therefore expand the coverage using division level data and proposing a novel proxy of woman's registration. The proxy is the share of local electors, the only

category where women could register, over the total electorate. In this section, we use the individual-level data to validate our proxy. We show that the growth in a share of local electors is strongly correlated with a growth in the share of women among local electors (Table 2, Model 1). Note that the coefficient is close to but less than one, which suggests that division-level analysis is likely to provide a conservative (lower bound) estimate in the change of women's registration. Altogether, these results demonstrate that an increase in the share of local electors is driven by an increase in women's registration, providing reassurance on the validity of our proxy.

8 Division-Level Analysis

In this section, we first present our baseline estimates of the effect of the march on the share of local electors. We then present further evidence consistent with our argument that the effects of the march can be attributed to suffragists' in-person campaigning activities that spurred *other women's* political socialization. Specifically, we demonstrate that the effect of the march is limited to localities close to the march where in-person contact was most likely, that the march did not boost men's registration, and that it spurred women's mobilization for suffrage, but not for other political causes.

Baseline Results Using Division-Level Data Table 3 presents the baseline regression results. Consistent with the descriptive patterns presented in Table 1, the results indicate that the march narrowed the difference between divisions on and outside of its path. Our coefficient of interest ($\hat{\beta}$) shows that divisions exposed by the march saw an increase in the share of local voters by about 1.3-1.5 percentage points compared to those not intersected by the march (Models 1-5). This represents approximately 8-9% of the average outcome, are significant at conventional levels, and stable whether or not we include the full battery of controls, which captures the divisions' demographic characteristics and social structure (Models 1 and 2). The results are also robust to excluding the year of the treatment and to focusing exclusively on the year before and after the 1913 march (Models 3 and 4). The results are also robust to excluding divisions with population above 15k and close to roads

Table 3: Baseline Effects of the March on the Share of Local Electors

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.014**	0.015**	0.013**	0.015**	0.015***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
DPost	−0.002	0.203	0.320	0.341	−0.384
	(0.005)	(0.476)	(0.509)	(0.556)	(0.692)
March	−0.020*	−0.025**	−0.023**	−0.025**	−0.018**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,938
R^2	0.048	0.257	0.263	0.250	0.286

Notes: ** p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; OLS estimates; unit of observation is polling division; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level; outcome is share of local electors over total electors registered; Appendix Table D.1 shows the estimates for all the control variables.*

(Model 5), which, in addition to the controls, provides further evidence against the concern that our results can be explained away by the urban and connected character of divisions intersected by the march.

These estimates are comparable in size to our results from the individual-level analysis and to those from similar research. They are of the same order of magnitude as those estimated by Larreboure and Gonzales (2021), who studies the effects of the Women's March of 2017 in the U.S. using a similar empirical strategy. Further, our baseline estimates of 8-9% of outcome mean are within the typical range for Get-Out-To-Vote (GOTV) experiments. For example, Gerber and Green (2000) estimates a roughly 18% of the mean outcome for direct canvassing and 1.3% for mail-only canvassing, whilst Braconnier et al. (2017), estimates that canvassing increases registration by approximately 14% of the mean.

Figure 2: The Effects of the March using Different Treatment Definitions.



Notes: *Plots the coefficient of interest $\hat{\beta}$, defined using different distance buffers; 90% and 95% CIs; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level, using Model 2 in Table 3.*

The Geographical Reach of the March If being exposed to the suffragists' campaigning in person was crucial for women's mobilization as theorized, we would expect the effects to be limited to localities very close to the the march. In these localities, women arguably got a first-hand experience of the campaigns and a direct exposure to the suffragists. To this end, we define different treatments using buffers with varying Euclidean distances from the centroid of the division to the closest point of the march. We present the results in Figure 2. As we would expect, the effects are meaningful in magnitude only for divisions very close to the march, up to about 2km from the march. This is despite the fact that the precision of the estimates increases with distance as we increase the size of the treated divisions. In other words, the march likely mattered in places where reaching the march was effortless (approximately less than half an hour walk). These results thus provide further support for the importance of in-person interactions along the route, rather than the mere exposition to information about the event. Information, for instance through local newspapers and word-to-mouth networks, would have traveled longer distances.[6]

The Effect of the March on Men If the suffragists campaigning activities spurred women's

[6]For example, the Weekly "Wakefield Advertiser & Gazette", from Wakefield (in our treatment group), regularly covered news from Ossett (4.5 km away, 40 articles in 1913); Horbury (4 km away, 52 articles in 1913); or Crofton (6 km away, 17 articles in 1913).

Table 4: The Effect of the March on Men

	Share of Parliamentary Voters over Population				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.017	0.008	0.006	0.005	0.009
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
DPost	−0.003	0.466	0.723	0.577	−0.861
	(0.006)	(1.673)	(2.269)	(2.133)	(1.452)
March	−0.045	−0.008	−0.007	−0.006	0.014
	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Sd dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Observations	3,222	3,222	1,620	2,490	2,604
R^2	0.195	0.391	0.403	0.404	0.408

Notes: * *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; OLS estimates; unit of observation is polling divison; standard errors clustered the parliamentary division level; outcome is share of parliamentary (men only) electors over total population of men.*

mobilization through means not readily available to men politicians, we would expect the march to mobilize women, not men. This is because the interaction between women and the suffragists is theorized to drive the effects, not an alternative link from suffragists to women and men voters, potentially involving other men politicians. To this end, we run our baseline regression with a different outcome that captures men's propensity to register, defined as the share of parliamentary electors (a category that only allowed men) over the total population of men. As expected, we find that there are no significant differences in the share of parliamentary electors between divisions where suffragists marched and those where they did not (Table 4). That is, we find no evidence that men reacted to the event, neither positively nor through backlash. This provides further support for the theorized

importance of women-to-women interactions in women's political socialization.

The Effect of the March on Suffrage Societies. If women's campaigning activities for suffrage directly spurred other women's political socialization as theorized, we would expect that the march mobilized more women into the suffrage movement, but not into another movement. To support this theory, we demonstrate that the march brought *new women* into the suffrage movement, but not into the anti-suffrage movement. To do so, we construct two additional outcomes, with data collected for the entire country. First, we assess new mobilization into the suffrage movement with a binary variable flagging the presence of a NUWSS society in the locality, for the period just prior the Pilgrimage and right after it (373 societies in the first quarter of 1913 and 451 in the first quarter of 1914, see map in Appendix Figure D.1). The results, shown in Table 5suggest that marched-on divisions see a 2.3 percentage point increase in the probability that a new suffrage society opened in 1914 compared to 1913 (Models 1 and 2). Second, we assess new mobilization into the anti-suffrage movement, by collecting data on the location of anti-suffrage societies (255 societies in the first quarter of 1913 and 255 in the first quarter of 1914, see Appendix Table D.1), and construct a similar outcome flagging the presence of an anti-suffrage society. As expected, the estimate of interest is close to nil and statistically insignificant. (Table 5, Models 3 and 4). Taken together, these results align with our argument that the march mobilized new women into the movement, as opposed to merely re-invigorating pre-existing local suffragist networks or mobilizing anti-suffragist women.

9 Threats to Inference

The suffragists marched through urban and connected locations that already had more suffrage societies. Our baseline empirical strategy overcomes the concern that our results reflect the differences in 'levels' between treated and control divisions by (i) relying on a differences-in-differences strategy that compares the change in registration before and after the march and by (ii) including a large battery of controls to account for these differences in levels. This strategy permits estimating the causal impact of the suffragists on registra-

Table 5: The Effect of the March on Societies

	NUWSS Branch		Anti-Suffrage Branch	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DPost X March	0.023*	0.023*	0.005	0.005
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.006)
DPost	0.027***	0.027***	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)
March	0.119***	0.043***	0.034	0.076***
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.025)	(0.029)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.17
Sd dep. var.	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
Observations	5,390	5,390	5,840	5,840
R^2	0.076	0.231	0.405	0.318

Notes: * *p<0.10*, ** *p<0.05*, *** *p<0.01; OLS estimates; unit of observation is a polling divison; standard errors clustered the parliamentary division level; outcome is a presence of NUWSS and Anti-Suffrage Societies.*

tion, provided that, in the absence of the march and conditional on observables, the share of local electors would have evolved similarly in treated and untreated divisions (parallel-trends assumption). In this section, we first assess the plausibility of this assumption by checking the absence of pre-trends. Then, we go further by casting doubts on the possibility that, even if trends were identical before the march, they may have changed afterwards for unobserved reasons.

Parallel Trends Assumption We run pre-trends tests for two baseline specifications with full battery of controls, one of which is limited to a smaller sub-sample of divisions that are close to roads and exclude the largest cities (as depicted in Models 2 and 5 in Table 3). We find that the effect of the march is not statistically different from zero and very small in magnitude for the years 1911 and 1912, whereas a significant jump above zero is recorded in 1914 (Appendix Figure E.1). This provides evidence on the plausibility of the parallel-trends assumption.

Urbanization along the March Path Some locations may have seen a change in registration trends only after the march, but for reasons separate from the march. In particular, the march joined urban centers, which were more likely to experienced other triggers of political mobilization. In the baseline analysis, we ruled out this concern by dropping urban centers and places far from main roads (Model 5 in Table 3). To further assess this concern, we also interact our variable of interest with a binary variable flagging urban centers. We define urban centers as divisions with a population about 15k inhabitants, which represents roughly the 20% largest treated divisions and the 5% largest overall. Appendix Table E.1 shows that this interaction does not establish significant pattern. Although statistically insignificant, the direction and magnitudes of the marginal effects suggest that, if anything, the impact of the march was stronger in more rural, remote localities where the suffragists were a novelty.

Connectedness along the March Path Suffragists walked along main roads, connecting urban centers on their way to London. This path selection raises the concern that marched-on divisions, independently of how urbanized they were, experienced changes in registration trends after the march, but for reasons separate from the march. For instance, women in connected places may have had more opportunities to learn from other triggers of political mobilization occurring elsewhere. We rule out this concern with two additional tests that rely on main roads connecting main urban centers through a different axis than the Pilgrimage's path to London. These roads are predominantly along old Roman roads.[7] The first test uses these alternative roads as a placebo treatment. Places along these main roads were well connected but did not experience the march. The results, presented in appendix Table E.3, show that this placebo treatment exhibits no meaningful or significant effect on the share of local voters. The second test assesses the sensitivity of our baseline results to drawing control divisions only from those along the alternative roads. Despite the sample size being smaller (N=387), precision of the coefficient of interest increases. The estimates

[7] Roman roads typically join large urban centers and have persistent effects on regional development (Dalgaard et al. 2022) and many of the chosen march paths were along Roman roads.

are also roughly doubled in magnitude, suggesting that our baseline results could be providing conservative estimates. Taken together, these results cast doubt on the concern that connectedness explains away our main estimates.

10 Alternative Explanations

The previous section rules out that unobserved events, separate from the march itself are driving our baseline estimates, in particular due to urbanization and connectedness in treated divisions. In this section, we consider several alternative explanations for why and how the march spurred women's registration. We theorized that direct contact with suffragists directly increased political participation. Alternatively, we may still worry that the march was exploited by existing political organizations, such as pre-existing suffrage societies (pro- or anti-suffrage ones), or politicians. In this case, the march would still drive the effects observed, but for reasons other than theorized. Below, we rule out the most plausible alternative explanations.

Did Registration Increase Because of Pre-Existing Suffrage Societies? One concern stems from a placement of the march through locations with a pre-existing suffrage society. The absence of meaningful pre-trends casts serious doubts on the possibility that our results reflect non-march related activities of existing suffrage societies. However, we may still worry that our results reflect campaigning activities of local suffrage societies that have been re-invigorated by the march. In this case, our results would still be driven by suffragists activities, but not necessarily by the in-person campaigning along the march. To this end, we conduct a horserace exercise comparing the effect of two treatments in the same models (Appendix Tables F.1 and F.2): proximity to the march (our main treatment effect) with the proximity to a NUWSS society or 1866 suffrage petition signatories (alternative treatment effects).[8] First, there is no significant treatment effect of proximity to a society or the 1866 signatories, leaving the baseline treatment effect of the march unchanged. Sec-

[8]Data from the "Women Suffrage Project", which provide geo-locations of roughly 1500 signatories of the 1866 Women's Suffrage Petition. This data indicates early suffragism of individuals who were likely to join *any* of the suffrage societies or pro-suffrage societies at that time or in the years to come.

ond, the treatment effect of the march interacted with the proximity to a society or petition signatories is negative, with a suffrage society nearby taking away any positive effects of the march. In short, the effect of the march is mostly driven by locations *without* a NUWSS suffrage society - the opposite of what we would expect if the march merely reinvigorated local suffrage societies. These results provide further support for our argument that the march mobilized non-organized women in localities previously unexposed to organized local suffragists campaigning.

Did Registration Increase Because of Pre-Existing Anti-Suffragist Societies? Another potential concern is that the increase in women's registration following the march reflects campaigns of anti-suffragists spurred to action because of the march, not the campaigning activities of the marching suffragists. Perhaps women were appalled by the organized meetings of anti-suffragists along the march path, which spurred them into action. To this end, we conduct another horserace exercise with alternative treatments (Appendix Table F.3). We find that there is no significant effect of a proximity to an anti-suffrage society, leaving the baseline treatment effects of the march unchanged. Importantly, the effect of the march does not depend on the proximity to an anti-suffrage society: the interaction term between the treatment effect of the march and the proximity to anti-suffrage society is not statistically significant. It could still be that anti-suffrage societies affected the overall effects of the march but the effects are noisy due to the small number of anti-suffrage societies. However, the direction and magnitude of the triple interaction term suggests that, if anything, the presence of anti-suffrage society negated the positive effects of the march - the opposite of what we would expect if women were spurred to register because of anti-suffragists campaigning. Altogether these results provide reassurance that counter-mobilization of anti-suffragists is not driving the baseline effects.

Did Registration Increase Because of Workers' Organizations? A potential concern is that the increase in women's registration following the march reflects re-invigoration of other political organizations, not the campaigning activities of the suffragists. The most

common organizations supporting or joining the march were worker's associations. To probe this possibility, we digitize data on the location of strike events in 1913 prior to the march [9] and conduct another horserace exercise (Appendix Table F.4). Contrary to this explanation, if anything, strikes are negatively associated with the share of local electors over total electors, but this effect is not robust. Importantly, the triple interaction term between the treatment effect of the march and the proximity to a strike event is close to zero and far from statistical significance, suggesting that the effects of the march are independent of worker's mobilization. Altogether, these results suggests that a re-invigoration of workers' mobilization is not driving the main result.

Did Registration Increase Because of Elections? A potential concern is that politicians standing for council elections may have exploited the march to campaign for an upcoming election, potentially driving the increase in women's registration. Men and women of esteemed positions in local communities indeed participated in the public meetings held along the march path. However, local elections that took place during the period under study (1911-1914) were commonly non-partisan and unopposed, perhaps with the exception of some larger towns (e.g. Ottewill (2004)on Guilford; Jones (1969), ch.2 on Wolverhampton). There were no parliamentary elections taking place during this period. We nonetheless probe this concern by examining the calendar for local elections and verify it with election mentions in local newspapers. Out of five council elections of concern (county, parish, rural districts, urban districts and municipal borough councils), only one (rural district councils) could potentially contaminate our results because they were the only ones that took place *after* the march. However, these elections only elected a third of councillors, would have been often uncontested and took place in an off-election year. As such, this election produced relatively few newspaper mentions (See Appendix Figure F.1). For a detailed discussion of the election calendar and newspaper mentions, see Appendix F.4.

[9] These data are digitized from Great Britain Board of Trade (1914). There are 322 strikes at the national level in 1913, and 66 fall within the counties selected for the study.

11 Additional Robustness Checks

Dependent Variable. We validated the use of our proxy using individual level data from 18 parishes in West Riding of Yorkshire. In this section, we go a step further to demonstrate that the increase in the share of local electors in the division-level sample of four counties is also driven by women. We demonstrate that the march-on-registration effects depend on the expected size of the potential women electorate. Given that married and poor women faced most substantial restrictions to register, we proxy the potential pool of eligible women with three indicators flagging above median shares in the following categories: (i) never-married women, (ii) single person households (this category is preferred to the former one since it also includes widowed women), and the interaction of these two variables with higher share of upper class individuals. In line with our expectation, we find that the march-on-registration effects are driven by, and substantially higher in, those flagged locations (see Appendix Tables G.1, G.2, G.3 and G.4).

Specification. We show that the baseline results are robust to alternative specifications. First, the inclusion of polling division fixed effects, although the estimates are smaller in magnitude as expected (Appendix Table G.5). Whilst this has the advantage of really absorbing all time-invarying confounders at the polling division, it is not our preferred specification given that it is prone to attenuation bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, pp: 225-226). Second, we verify that the results hold after we individually drop counties, eliminating the concern that our results are driven by a single county (see Appendix Table G.6).

Standard Errors. One potential issue is that our control group has significantly more parishes than the treatment group. We show that restricting the size of a control group only to divisions along main roads (see Appendix section) returns efects that are larger and more precise (see Appendix Figure E.2). Another concern relates to the choice of clustering. We show that our baseline result is not affected if we cluster using arbitrary clustering units of varying sizes to address concerns of spatial correlation (Appendix Figure G.1), estimate standard errors using Wild Cluster Bootstrap (Appendix Table G.7), or cluster them at the

level of the treatment and the county (Appendix Table G.8).

12 Discussion

Through the study of the first women voters in English local elections, this paper makes a contribution to our understanding of how were women incorporated into the electoral process. Previous research documents that the suffragists fostered women's participation by disseminating information at election times (Morgan-Collins 2021), and enabled politicians to better mobilize women voters (Skorge 2023). In this research, we uncover how the very act of enlarging own support network in the fight for suffrage, not a direct suffragists' or politicians' electoral strategy, facilitated women's political socialization. It seems perhaps somewhat ironic that suffragists campaigning activities designed to persuade men politicians to support suffrage inadvertently changed the minds of women.

Our focus on the first enfranchised women naturally limits generalizability to working-class women who faced greater legal restrictions to vote and had less time to participate in voluntary associations. At the same time, the extent to which women with the best opportunities to participate in politics mobilized should have lasting implications for the incorporation of all women into the electorate. The rise of the 'new' civic woman with independent means was important for the enfranchisement of all women (McCammon et al. 2001). A quick glance at the history of suffrage movements in the West also suggests that middle class women often supported suffrage expansion to all women, legislation to protect women workers and even mobilized working-class women into politics (Evans 2012).

One question that remains open is to what extent our findings are generalizable to further electoral years, to other countries and other groups. Whilst lack of electoral registers after 1914 prevents us from examining long-term effects of the march, it seems very plausible that the experience of voting once would have facilitated women's participating in the future by establishing voting habits or internalizing that politics was for women (Corder and Wolbrecht 2016). A quick glance on suffrage movements in other countries suggests that our findings are generalizable beyond the U.K. and beyond women's movement. Suf-

fragists in other countries typically employed a vast array of similar campaigning strategies, such as parades, protests and petitions (Banaszak 1996). This is also typically the case for other organized demands for suffrage, including the Civil Rights movement in the U.S. or the working-class movement for men's suffrage in Europe.

Finally, one may wonder whether our findings apply to more recent periods which usually have a greater number of women politicians. As full suffrage widened the possibilities of women to participate in politics, women politicians could have been more effective than women activists in spurring other women's electoral participation. However, women politicians not always campaign on women's issues or seek to tap into women's electorate, and a single woman politician can hardly encompass varied experiences and identities of all women (Celis et al. 2008). Whilst women activists face similar difficulties, the collective nature of the organizations provides an opportunity to articulate shared perspectives (Weldon 2002) and therefore the potential to mobilize and represent a wider population of women. This would suggest that women activists have an important role to play in women's mobilization long after women's suffrage.

References

Angrist, J. and J. Pischke (2009). *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: an Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton University Press.

Atkeson, L. R. (2003). Not all cues are created equal: The conditional impact of female candidates on political engagement. *The Journal of Politics 65*(4), 1040–1061.

Banaszak, L. A. (1996). *Why movements succeed or fail: Opportunity, culture, and the struggle for woman suffrage*, Volume 52. Princeton University Press.

Barnes, T. D. and S. M. Burchard (2013). "Engendering Politics": The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Women's Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Comparative Political Studies 46*(7), 767–790.

Beaman, L., R. Chattopadhyay, E. Duflo, R. Pande, and P. Topalova (2009, 11). Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Bias? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 124*(4), 1497–

1540.

Braconnier, C., J.-Y. Dormagen, and V. Pons (2017). Voter registration costs and disenfranchisement: experimental evidence from france. *American Political Science Review 111*(3), 584–604.

Caprettini, B., M. Caesmann, H. Voth, and D. Yanagizawa-Drott (2022). Going viral: Protests and Polarization in 1932 Hamburg. Mimeo, University of Zurich.

Carpenter, D., Z. Popp, T. Resch, B. Schneer, and N. Topich (2018). Suffrage Petitioning as Formative Practice: American Women Presage and Prepare for the Vote, 1840–1940. *Studies in American Political Development 32*(1), 24–48.

Cartwright, C. (2013). *Burning to Get the Vote: The Women's Suffrage Movement in Central Buckinghamshire, 1904-1914*. Legend Press Ltd.

Celis, K., S. Childs, J. Kantola, and M. L. Krook (2008). Rethinking women's substantive representation. *Representation 44*(2), 99–110.

Clayton, A. (2015). Women's political engagement under quota-mandated female representation: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment. *Comparative Political Studies 48*(3), 333–369.

Corder, K. and C. Wolbrecht (2006). Political context and the turnout of new women voters after suffrage. *The Journal of Politics 68*(1), 34–49.

Corder, K. and C. Wolbrecht (2016). *Counting Women's Ballots*. Cambridge University Press.

Crawford, E. (2001). *The women's suffrage movement: a reference guide, 1866-1928*. Psychology Press.

Dalgaard, C.-J., N. Kaarsen, O. Olsson, and P. Selaya (2022). Roman Roads to Prosperity: Persistence and Non-Persistence of Public Infrastructure. *Journal of Comparative Economics 50*(4), 896–916.

Desposato, S. and B. Norrander (2009). The gender gap in latin america: Contextual and individual influences on gender and political participation. *British journal of political science 39*(1), 141–162.

Evans, R. J. (2012). *The feminists: women's emancipation movements in Europe, America and*

Australasia 1840-1920. Routledge.

Franceschet, S., J. M. Piscopo, and G. Thomas (2016). Supermadres, maternal legacies and women's political participation in contemporary latin america. *Journal of Latin American Studies 48*(1), 1–32.

Gerber, A. S. and D. P. Green (2000). The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout:. *The American Political Science Review 94*(3), 653–663.

Goyal, T. (2021). *Representation from below: how women mobilize inside parties*. Ph. D. thesis, University of Oxford.

Graham, S. H. (1996). *Woman suffrage and the new democracy*. Berghahn Books.

Great Britain Board of Trade (1914). Report on strikes and lock-outs and on conciliation and arbitration boards in the UK in 1913. *Board of Trade Department of Labour Statistics*.

Grimshaw, P. (1987). *Women's suffrage in New Zealand*. Auckland University Press ; Oxford University Press Auckland, N.Z.

Herrnson, P. S., J. C. Lay, and A. K. Stokes (2003). Women running 'as women': Candidate gender, campaign issues, and voter-targeting strategies. *The Journal of Politics 65*(1), 244–255.

Hume, L. (2016). *The National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies*. Taylor & Francis.

Jones, G. (1969). The political background 1888–1919. In *Borough Politics: A Study of the Wolverhampton Town Council, 1888–1964*, pp. 29–52. Springer.

Karp, J. A. and S. A. Banducci (2008). When politics is not just a man's game: Women's representation and political engagement. *Electoral studies 27*(1), 105–115.

Kim, J. H. (2019). Direct democracy and women's political engagement. *American Journal of Political Science 63*(3), 594–610.

Kittilson, M. C. (2008). Representing women: The adoption of family leave in comparative perspective. *The Journal of Politics 70*(2), 323–334.

Kraditor, A. S. (1965). The ideas of the woman suffrage movement, 1890-1920.

Larreboure, M. and F. Gonzales (2021). The impact of the women's march on the u.s. house election. Technical report, QMUL Mimeo.

Liu, S.-J. S. (2018). Are female political leaders role models? lessons from asia. *Political*

Research Quarterly 71(2), 255–269.

Liu, S.-J. S. and L. A. Banaszak (2017). Do government positions held by women matter? a cross-national examination of female ministers' impacts on women's political participation. *Politics & Gender 13*(1), 132–162.

McCammon, H. J., K. E. Campbell, E. M. Granberg, and C. Mowery (2001). How movements win: Gendered opportunity structures and us women's suffrage movements, 1866 to 1919. *American sociological review*, 49–70.

McConnaughy, C. M. (2013). *The Woman Suffrage Movement in America: A Reassessment*. Cambridge University Press.

Morgan-Collins, M. (2021). The electoral impact of newly enfranchised groups: The case of women's suffrage in the united states. *The Journal of Politics 83*(1), 150–165.

Morgan-Collins, M. (2023). Bringing in the new votes: Turnout of women after enfranchisement. *American Political Science Review*, 1–16.

Morgan-Collins, M. (2024). How gap measures determine results: The case of proportional systems and the gender mobilization gap. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1–9.

O'Brien, D. Z. and J. M. Piscopo (2019). The Impact of Women in Parliament. In S. Franceschet, M. L. Krook, and N. Tan (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Women's Political Rights*, Gender and Politics, pp. 53–72. Springer.

Ottewill, R. (2004). The changing character of municipal elections 1835-1974. *LOCAL HISTORIAN-LONDON- 34*(3), 159–178.

Pugh, M. (2000). *The March of the Women: A Revisionist Analysis of the Campaign for Women's Suffrage 1866-1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Reyes-Housholder, C. (2018). Women mobilizing women: Candidates' strategies for winning the presidency. *Journal of Politics in Latin America 10*(1), 69–97.

Robinson, J. (2018). Pilgrimage of greats: Why the march of the suffragists should be commemorated. *TLS. Times Literary Supplement* (5993), 16–17.

Schaffner, B. F. (2005). Priming gender: Campaigning on women's issues in us senate elections. *American Journal of Political Science 49*(4), 803–817.

Skorge, Ø. S. (2023). Mobilizing the underrepresented: Electoral systems and gender in-

equality in political participation. *American Journal of Political Science 67*(3), 538–552.

Teele, D. L. (2018). *Forging the Franchise: The Political Origins of the Women's Vote*. Princeton University Press.

Thomsen, D. M. and M. L. Swers (2017). Which women can run? gender, partisanship, and candidate donor networks. *Political Research Quarterly 70*(2), 449–463.

Van Wingerden, S. A. (1999). *The women's suffrage movement in Britain, 1866-1928*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Weeks, A. C. (2022). *Making Gender Salient: From Gender Quota Laws to Policy*. Cambridge University Press.

Weldon, S. L. (2002). Beyond bodies: Institutional sources of representation for women in democratic policymaking. *The Journal of Politics 64*(4), 1153–1174.

Wolbrecht, C. and D. E. Campbell (2007). Leading by example: Female members of parliament as political role models. *American Journal of Political Science 51*(4), 921–939.

Wolbrecht, C. and D. E. Campbell (2017). Role models revisited: Youth, novelty, and the impact of female candidates. *Politics, Groups, and Identities 5*(3), 418–434.

Wolbrecht, C. and J. K. Corder (2020). *A Century of Votes for Women: American Elections Since Suffrage*. Cambridge University Press.

Becoming Political: How Marching Suffragists Facilitated Women's Electoral Participation in England

Online Appendix

A Voting Rights in Local Elections

Whilst the pilgrims marched for parliamentary suffrage, some women have already secured the right to vote in local elections (Richardson 2013). By then, men who owned or rented property above a threshold value could vote; about 66% of adult men were enfranchised by 1910 (Wright 2002, p.60). Single and widowed women recovered historical right to vote in local elections with the Municipal Franchise Act 1869 (Heater 2006, p.123), and some married women with The Local Government Act of 1894. Property or rent qualifications were still required on all electors, but married women could not qualify on the same property as their husbands. Whilst it is hard to determine the exact composition of the eligible women electorate by class and marital status, married and working-class women certainly faced tighter conditions to register. On the one hand, married women needed to be in a household with more than one qualifying property (e.g. a rented house and shop) or have a husband who did not register as a local elector. On the other hand, single and widowed women of even relatively modest professions, such as laundresses, schoolmistresses or dressmakers frequently appeared on electoral registers (Richardson 2013). Over one million women had the local vote by 1900 (Hollis 1987, p.31).

B County Sample Selection

Table B.1: Comparing Sampled Counties with England

	England	**Sample**	**Gloucestershire**	**Surrey**	**Norfolk**	**Yorkshire (W. R.)**
Election 1910 (Dec)						
Entitled to vote	4,756,016	911,056	131,879	269,551	98,083	411,543
% Turnout	88.3	81.9	84.3	76.2	94.2	82
% Conservative Vote	48.5	45.5	47.3	53.3	40.8	41.4
% Liberal Vote	43.4	47.3	52.6	46.2	48.4	45.8
% Labour Vote	7.9	7.2	0	0.4	10.8	12.8
Census 1911						
Population	36,070,492	5,125,891	672,570	920,016	488,697	3,044,608
Pop. Density (sq.mi)	620.1	779.5	604.9	1272.8	243.4	1113.8
% pop. in Agric. sub-distr.	18.8	11.8	15.4	0.6	55.5	6.2
% pop. in Profes. sub-distr.	39.4	44.2	36.3	94.7	33.3	29.3
% pop. in Indust. sub-distr.	31.5	34.6	19.6	0	1.9	53.7

Notes: *Election data sourced from Eggers-Spirling data set. Election data excludes unopposed constituencies (N=72); Census data from 1911 Census, collected and geocoded by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure (CAMPOP); CAMPOP defines registration sub-districts as Agricultural if more than 5% worked in agriculture and density was below 1 person per acre; otherwise as Textile if more than 25% worked in textiles, otherwise as Mining if more than 30% worked in mining or metals, otherwise as Professional and Semi-Professional if more than 7.5% worked in professions; otherwise as Transport if more than 15% worked in transport. Industrial combines units defined as textile, mining and transport. The Table shows that the four counties represent distinct electoral and occupational contexts across England. Surrey was densely populated, highly professional, leaned Conservative and had relatively lower turnout. Norfolk was scarcely populated, agricultural, leaned Liberal, and had above average turnout and support for Labour. West Riding of Yorkshire was densely populated, industrial, leaned Liberal and had above average support for Labour. Gloucestershire's electoral and occupation distribution was perhaps most closely representative of the entire England, although less industrial. Compared to England, the four selected counties leaned slightly more Liberal overall, had a slightly lower turnout, higher population density and were less agricultural. One concern is therefore generalizability of our results to more rural counties, although we do not find that the march spurred women's registration only in urban divisions in the four sampled counties.*

C Data Sources and Collection

Electoral registers.

Electoral registers are the lists of names of individuals entitled to vote in the polling district in which they are listed during the lifetime of the register. No one can vote elsewhere than where they are registered and anyone omitted from the register cannot vote at all. Electoral registers were first produced under the Representation of the People Act 1832 and continue to be published today (see for example, Carter, Jacquie and Jennie Grimshaw. 2016. UK Electoral Registers and their Uses. Technical report The British Library.) We retrieve the registers from Ancestry.com when available, and from local archives otherwise. We geolocate the registers using 1911 shapefiles from the historical statistical project "A Vision of Britain", Great Britain Historical GIS Project. 2017. Great Britain Historical GIS. University of Portsmouth. In order to proxy women's share of total registration, that is the share of electors who registered for local elections only among all electors, we use data from 'summary pages' at the end of each register. The summary pages detail the number of electors registered within each voting category at the polling division level for the counties of Gloucestershire, Norfolk, Surrey, and at the parish levels for the West Riding of Yorkshire.

March path.

We recover major cities and towns intersected by the march using an original NUWSS map, published on July 11, 1913 in The Common Cause (Figure C.1). This map establishes the 'nodes' of the march, that is the major cities and towns intersected by the march. In our four sampled counties, we establish the full path of the march with historical roads that connect these 'nodes' , using the Ordnance Survey of England and Wales (1903-1906) that represents the closest publication to the first year in our sample (1910). Outside of the sample, we establish the path between the 'nodes' with a straight line for illustrative purposes only.

Demographic variables.

Our control variables come from 1911 census. These data were collected and geocoded by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure (CAMPOP) (The

Cambridge Group,'Population Past: an Interactive Atlas of Victorian and Edwardian Population', Local Population Studies 100 (2018), pp. 77-81.) The CAMPOP data also report proxy measures of broad social class categories defined by the standard historical international social class scheme, HISCLASS (see van Leeuwen, Marco H.D. and Maas, Ineke, HISCLASS: A Historical International Social Class Scheme Third (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011). Information of roads in the sample comes from the 1904 Ordnance Survey Maps of the UK, which we georeference and geocode. The location of cities, necessary to compute distance to cities, comes from the Urban Population Database (Bennett 2012).

Individual-level data from electoral registers.

The sub-sample of 20 randomly selected parishes contains individual-level data from the electoral registers in West Riding of Yorkshire. Using the individual-level entries, we extract the names of all individuals registered to vote in the parish for each voting category. We then establish the gender of each individual in the sample based on their first names and using Chat-GTP, which we cross validate with the package "Genderize" in R and manually by going through the attributed genders one by one. Roughly 2% of names could not be coded as either women or men due to unisex or illegible first name. Note that whilst this approach provides the most precise indicator of women's share of registration, it is only feasible for a subset of locations and years. This procedure is extremely time consuming, in particular because the company that owns the picture's registers (Ancestry.com) does not allow researchers to access to their materials in bulk (through webscraping or an API), which could otherwise have been processed using OCR. Note too that Ancestry's digital records are fairly accurate regarding names, but are very noisy in their tagging of places, and do not tag the type of electors at all - but we need to separate local electors from the rest. For our research, we thus collected the information on place and type of elector manually form the PDFs. Although time-consuming compared to processing the PDFs with AI, this approach minimizes error which we consider to be a key objective to accurately summarize the characteristics of the divisions considered.

Figure C.1: The March Path

(*For other Maps, see future issues of* THE COMMON CAUSE.)

Notes: *This is a copy of the maps of the march printed in The Common Cause.*

Figure C.2: Map of randomly selected parishes for analysis at the individual level



Notes: *March path in sample is along main roads connecting the scheduled stopping points (see Appendix Figure C.1. This map shows the location of the randomly selected parishes (in purple) along with the march path and the intersecting Roman road in West Riding of Yorkshire.*

Table C.1: Summary Statistics - Individual and Division-Level Data, with Controls

	Outside Path		On March Path			
	Mean (1)	Sd (2)	Mean (3)	Sd (4)	Diff (1)-(3) (5)	P-Val (6)
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL DATA						
Electoral Registration Measures 1911:						
Total Electors (100)	6.91	9.42	3.09	3.6	-3.82	0.22
Number of Women	90.73	123.03	35.43	31.26	-55.3	0.27
Share Local over Total Electors	0.23	0.04	0.13	0.06	-0.09	0
Electoral Registration Measures, 1914:						
Total Electors (100)	6.99	9.64	3.17	3.79	-3.83	0.29
Number of Women	91.27	123.74	36.86	31.05	-54.42	0.28
Share Local over Total Electors	0.22	0.04	0.14	0.06	-0.08	0
Observations	10		10			
DIVISION-LEVEL DATA						
Electoral Registration Measures, pre-1913:						
Total Electors (100)	6.224	18.162	13.327	18.162	-7.103	0
Local Electors (100)	0.968	1.942	1.497	1.942	-0.529	0.006
Share Local over Total Electors	0.163	0.056	0.135	0.056	0.027	0.129
Electoral Registration Measures, post-1913:						
Total Electors (100)	6.709	18.238	12.506	18.238	-5.797	0
Local Electors (100)	1.042	2.069	1.631	2.069	-0.589	0.005
Share Local over Total Electors	0.161	0.057	0.148	0.057	0.014	0.487
Control Variables:						
Distance to City (km)	10.54	6.61	7.09	6.61	3.45	0
Population (thousands)	3.52	57.64	20.06	57.64	-16.53	0.02
Distance to Road (km)	1.26	0.97	0.49	0.97	0.77	0
Average Age	28.94	1.92	29.04	1.92	-0.09	0.71
Female Share of Population	0.5	0.04	0.52	0.04	-0.02	0
Single Person HouseHolds, pct	6.46	2.3	5.61	2.3	0.86	0
Total Fertility Rate (children per women)	3.09	0.79	2.84	0.79	0.24	0.02
Age at Marriage for Women	26.27	1.45	26.75	1.45	-0.48	0.01
Female Celibacy Rate	15.66	7.4	17.41	7.4	-1.75	0.07
Male Celibacy Rate	13.4	3.95	12.33	3.95	1.07	0.04
Married Women Working, pct	8.38	2.35	7.55	2.35	0.83	0.02
Child Mortality Rate, per thousand	42.58	22.94	43.61	22.94	-1.03	0.73
HISCLASS High Skill Non-Manual, pct	3.18	1.39	4.02	1.39	-0.85	0
HISCLASS High Skill Manual, pct	21.96	5.66	22.51	5.66	-0.55	0.46
HISCLASS Low Skill Skill Non-Manual, pct	12.82	6.11	16.86	6.11	-4.04	0
HISCLASS Low Skill Manual, pct	32.01	16.52	28.14	16.52	3.87	0.08
HISCLASS Unskilled	29.92	14.27	28.24	14.27	1.68	0.38
Observations	968		62			

D Supplementary Results

D.1 Baseline Results with all Control Variables

Table D.1: Baseline Regression, All Control Variables Displayed

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.014**	0.015**	0.013**	0.015**	0.015***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)
DPost	−0.002	0.203	0.320	0.341	−0.384
	(0.005)	(0.476)	(0.509)	(0.556)	(0.692)
March	−0.020*	−0.025**	−0.023**	−0.025**	−0.018**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Distance to City (log, km)		0.002	0.002	−0.000	0.002
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Population (log, thousands)		−0.003	−0.003	−0.004	−0.001
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Distance to Road (log, km)		−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.020***
		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Average Age		0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000
		(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Female Share of Population		0.284***	0.270***	0.291***	0.258**
		(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.133)
Share of Single Person Households, pct		0.006***	0.006***	0.006***	0.004*
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Fertility Rate (children per women)		−0.003	0.004	−0.004	−0.001
		(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Age at Marriage for Women		0.004*	0.005**	0.003	0.007**
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female Celibacy Rate		0.002*	0.002***	0.002*	0.002
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male Celibacy Rate		−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001***	−0.001*
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Share of Married Women Working		0.001	0.001*	0.000	0.000
		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
HISCLASS 1 (High Skill Non Manual, pct)		−0.015	−0.014	−0.014	−0.027**
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)
HISCLASS 2 (Lower Skill Non Manual, pct)		−0.005	−0.004	−0.003	−0.015
		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
HISCLASS 3 (High Skill Manual, pct)		−0.006	−0.005	−0.005	−0.016*
		(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
HISCLASS 4 (Lower Skill Manual, pct)		−0.006	−0.005	−0.005	−0.017*
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
HISCLASS 5 (Unskilled)		−0.008	−0.007	−0.006	−0.018*
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Early Child Mortality Rate (per 100,0000)		−0.023	−0.026	−0.021	−0.036
		(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,938
R^2	0.048	0.257	0.263	0.250	0.286

Notes: * *p<0.10*, ** *p<0.05*, *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the parliamentary division level. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. All the controls are described in the text are included in the regression, but the interactions with the DPost variables are not shown for the sake of saving space.*

Table D.2: Pre-trends Regression, All Control Variables Displayed

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1914 X March	0.006	0.014*	0.013**	0.017***	0.017*
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)
1912 X March	−0.009	0.001		0.004	0.003
	(0.009)	(0.007)		(0.003)	(0.008)
1911 X March	−0.012	−0.002			−0.001
	(0.009)	(0.007)			(0.008)
1914	0.002	0.041	0.320	0.361	0.184
	(0.002)	(0.432)	(0.509)	(0.640)	(0.493)
1912	0.005	−0.285		0.035	0.747
	(0.007)	(0.426)		(0.297)	(0.881)
1911	0.007	−0.320			0.781
	(0.007)	(0.540)			(0.979)
March	−0.012	−0.025**	−0.023**	−0.027**	−0.019
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Distance to City (log, km)		0.007	0.002	−0.001	0.006
		(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Population (log, thousands)		0.000	−0.003	−0.005	0.002
		(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Distance to Road (log, km)		−0.006	−0.002	−0.001	−0.015**
		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Average Age		0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002
		(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Female Share of Population		0.268***	0.270***	0.312***	0.294***
		(0.083)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.109)
Share of Single Person Households, pct		0.004**	0.006***	0.006***	0.003
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Total Fertility Rate (children per women)		−0.001	0.004	−0.011	0.001
		(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.013)
Age at Marriage for Women		0.006*	0.005**	0.001	0.007**
		(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female Celibacy Rate		0.001	0.002***	0.001	0.001
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male Celibacy Rate		−0.001**	−0.001***	−0.001**	−0.001
		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Share of Married Women Working		0.002**	0.001*	−0.000	0.001
		(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
HISCLASS 1 (High Skill Non Manual, pct)		−0.016*	−0.014	−0.013	−0.017*
		(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
HISCLASS 2 (Lower Skill Non Manual, pct)		−0.007	−0.004	−0.003	−0.010
		(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
HISCLASS 3 (High Skill Manual, pct)		−0.009	−0.005	−0.004	−0.012
		(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
HISCLASS 4 (Lower Skill Manual, pct)		−0.009	−0.005	−0.004	−0.012
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
HISCLASS 5 (Unskilled)		−0.010	−0.007	−0.006	−0.013
		(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Early Child Mortality Rate (per 100,0000)		−0.027	−0.026	−0.016	−0.029
		(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.025)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,492	3,486	1,766	2,713	2,909
R^2	0.049	0.263	0.263	0.251	0.289

Notes: * *p<0.10*, ** *p<0.05*, *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the parliamentary division level. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. All the controls are described in the text are included in the regression, but the interactions with the year binary variables are not shown for the sake of saving space.*

D.2 Map of NUWSS Societies

Figure D.1: Map of NUWSS and Anti-Suffrage Suffrage Societies



Notes: *This map shows the location of NUWSS and Anti-Suffrage societies in 1913 and 1914.*

E Threats to Inference

E.1 Parallel Trends Assumption

Figure E.1: Pre-Trends Analysis



Notes: *Plots the coefficient of the treatment* ($March_p$) *interacted with year FE; 1913 is taken as a reference; 95% and 90% CIs; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level; models run separately for full sample and a restricted sample* (<15k *and within 2 km of a road*). *Appendix Table D.2 shows the estimates for all the control variables.*

E.2 Urban Character of Marched-On Localities

Table E.1: Heterogeneity of the March on Registration: Effects by Urbanization

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.016**	0.015**	0.014**	0.016***	0.015***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
DPost X March X Urban	−0.024	−0.010	−0.022	−0.016	−0.004
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.021)
DPost X Urban	−0.002	−0.222	−0.171	−0.174	−0.458
	(0.005)	(0.643)	(0.717)	(0.768)	(0.769)
Urban X March	−0.003	−0.016	−0.011	−0.015	−0.012
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
DPost	−0.045	−0.074*	−0.061	−0.067	−0.079*
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.047)
March	−0.014	−0.018*	−0.017*	−0.019*	−0.019**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Urban	−0.014	0.005	−0.000	0.004	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	No
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,490	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,985
R^2	0.051	0.262	0.267	0.254	0.284

Notes: * *p<0.10*, ** *p<0.05*, *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the parliamentary division level. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Controls are described in the text.*

E.3 Connected Character of Marched-On Localities

Figure E.2: Map of a 'Placebo' March Along Roman Roads



Notes: *This map shows the location of the treated divisions, those along the actual Pilgrimage route, and those along the 'placebo' march path. The 'placebo' march path is constricted by following divisions located along the largest roads connecting the largest urban hubs in the region, but that are not located along the path of the Pilgrimage. In the West Riding of Yorkshire, we use the road from York to Manchester crossing through Leeds, in Gloucestershire we choose the road from Gloucester to Bristol. In Surrey and Norfolk, the major axis go in the direction of London so we chose a path in the direction of London but that is an alternative routes to the suffragists' way, along roads that the direction of historical Roman roads. The Roman roads shape files are from McCormick, Michael, Huang, Guoping, Zambotti, Giovanni, and Lavash, Jessica, "Roman Road Network (version 2008 available on Harvard Dataverse)", Harvard University (2008).*

Table E.2: The Baseline Effects of the March on the Share of Local Electors Among Registered, with Robustness to Selected Control Group Along Roman Roads.

	Share of Local Electors					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DPost X March	0.014**	0.015**	0.013**	0.015**	0.015***	0.039***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.012)
DPost	−0.002	0.203	0.320	0.341	−0.384	0.703
	(0.005)	(0.476)	(0.509)	(0.556)	(0.692)	(2.239)
March	−0.020*	−0.025**	−0.023**	−0.025**	−0.018**	−0.040**
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.019)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
Along Roman Roads	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.07
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,938	387
R^2	0.048	0.257	0.263	0.250	0.286	0.305

Notes: ** p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; OLS estimates; unit of observation is polling division; standard errors clustered at the parliamentary division level; outcome is share of local electors over total electors registered. Model 6 uses only divisions along Roman Roads as control divisions.*

Table E.3: The Placebo March Along Roman Roads

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X 'Placebo' March	−0.012*	−0.012	−0.007	−0.016	−0.012
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)
DPost	−0.001	0.162	0.282	0.215	−0.404
	(0.005)	(0.546)	(0.607)	(0.654)	(0.728)
'Placebo' March	0.018	−0.001	−0.005	0.003	−0.000
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1912	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,311	3,305	1,672	2,568	2,752
R^2	0.051	0.267	0.273	0.258	0.284

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. The variable of interest is a binary variable equal to one if the division intersects the path of the placebo march. The placebo march runs along main roads that connected the largest urban centers in the county without following the path of the march.*

F Alternative Explanations

F.1 Did Registration Increase Because of Pre-Existing Suffrage Societies?

Table F.1: Comparing Two Treatments: March and NUWSS Society

	Share of Local Electors					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DPost X March	0.011	0.015**	0.006	0.013*	0.016**	0.017**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
DPost X Society	−0.002	−0.006*	−0.005	−0.005	−0.002	−0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Society	0.010	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.003	0.009
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.010)
DPost	0.001	−0.351	−0.083	−0.242	−0.262	−0.469
	(0.002)	(0.447)	(0.460)	(0.540)	(0.483)	(0.535)
March	−0.026*	−0.029**	−0.021	−0.028*	−0.031**	−0.023**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)
DPost X March X Society					−0.011	
					(0.009)	
March X Society					0.012	
					(0.030)	
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	1,467	1,463	763	1,137	1,463	1,230
R^2	0.155	0.252	0.269	0.251	0.253	0.302

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered.*

Table F.2: Comparing Two Treatments: March and 1866 Suffrage Petition

	Share of Local Electors					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DPost X March	0.010	0.014*	0.005	0.012	0.015*	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
DPost X Petitition 1866	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.006	0.010	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Petitition 1866	0.010	−0.002	−0.005	−0.006	0.006	−0.012
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)
DPost	0.001	−0.384	−0.156	−0.322	−0.984	−0.506
	(0.002)	(0.458)	(0.444)	(0.559)	(0.652)	(0.536)
March	−0.024*	−0.028**	−0.020	−0.027*	−0.024*	−0.022*
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)
DPost X March X Petitition 1866					−0.066***	
					(0.025)	
March X Petitition 1866					−0.075	
					(0.056)	
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	1,467	1,463	763	1,137	1,463	1,230
R^2	0.156	0.252	0.269	0.250	0.260	0.302

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered.*

F.2 Did Registration Increase Because of Counter-Mobilization?

Table F.3: Comparing Two Treatments: March and Anti-Suffrage Society.

	Share of Local Electors					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DPost X March	0.010	0.014*	0.005	0.012	0.016**	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
DPost X Society-Anti	−0.001	0.001	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Society-Anti	−0.005	−0.006	−0.009	−0.008	−0.007	−0.001
	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)
DPost	0.001	−0.396	−0.167	−0.321	−0.315	−0.443
	(0.002)	(0.455)	(0.441)	(0.548)	(0.526)	(0.512)
March	−0.024*	−0.028**	−0.019	−0.027*	−0.028**	−0.022*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
DPost X March X Society-Anti					−0.018**	
					(0.008)	
March X Society-Anti					0.005	
					(0.021)	
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	1,467	1,463	763	1,137	1,463	1,230
R^2	0.155	0.252	0.269	0.251	0.252	0.301

Notes: * *p<0.10*, ** *p<0.05*, *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is a presence of an Anti-Suffrage Society.*

F.3 Did Registration Increase Because of Other Organizations?

Table F.4: Comparing Two Treatments: March and Strikes

	Share of Local Electors					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DPost X March	0.011	0.014*	0.006	0.012	0.014*	0.016**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
DPost X Strike	−0.002	−0.007	−0.010	−0.007	−0.001	−0.006
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Strike	−0.029	−0.037	−0.034	−0.037	0.021	0.007
	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.017)	(0.020)
DPost	0.001	−0.355	−0.094	−0.255	−0.332	−0.464
	(0.002)	(0.424)	(0.422)	(0.513)	(0.426)	(0.527)
March	−0.023*	−0.028**	−0.019	−0.026*	−0.026**	−0.021*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)
DPost X March X Strike					−0.011	
					(0.018)	
March X Strike					−0.118***	
					(0.022)	
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	1,467	1,463	763	1,137	1,463	1,230
R^2	0.155	0.254	0.270	0.252	0.257	0.301

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is a presence of a strike event.*

F.4 Did Registration Increase Because of Politicians' Election Campaigns?

In this section, we address the concern that those standing for council elections may have exploited the march to campaign for upcoming election, potentially driving the increase in women's registration following the march. Whilst this seems unlikely given that local elections were often non-partisan and uncontested, we nonetheless examine the election calendar (as stipulated by the Local Government Act 1894).

There were no nationwide parliamentary elections held during the period of the study (1911-1914) that could contaminate our results. County and parish council elections took place on or before April 15 1913. County and parish elections took place every three years, with the 1913 elections being the only elections held during the period we study (1911-1914). This election took place several months before the suffragists march in the summer of the same year. Given registration for these elections would have to be completed in the fall of 1912, it would not have been possible for politicians to exploit the summer march of 1913 to mobilize for the local spring elections of the same year.

Municipal boroughs, and rural and urban district council elections took place annually (November and March/April respectively). These elections elected a third of councillors each year. We demonstrate above that our results are robust to excluding urban areas and therefore municipal boroughs and urban districts (see Table 3 in the paper). It is reassuring that our results are stronger in rural, previously uncontacted places, where campaigning for council elections may be weakest.

The only elections of concern are therefore off-year (not coinciding with the 1913 election year) rural district elections held in 1914. Women could have registered for this elections following the march.

Although the electoral calendar makes it unlikely that elections would have completely driven our results, we gauge empirically the intensity of election campaigning around the timing of the march to rule out this concern empirically. To this end, we examine mentions of council elections in local newspapers, using the keywords "council" and "elections" on

the British Newspaper Archive.

First, we validate the election calendar and intensity of media attention to council elections by plotting the frequencies of articles found per month during the period Jan 1st 1912 to September 31st 1914 (Figure F.1). We confirm that public debate of local elections predominantly occurred in March and April 1913, with smaller annual 'spikes' in November and March/April each year. Whilst the exact date of local elections often varied within and across counties, this analysis confirms that any deviations from the electoral calendar would have been minor. Importantly, it also shows that the summer (when the march took place) is always be a period with the lowest media attention to any local elections. This is consistent with a weak campaigning at the time of the march and cast doubts on the possibility that local candidates run robust media campaigns to boost their support for upcoming elections.

Second, we validate that media 'spike' in 1913 by ensuring that it is not driven by few important elections, such as London County elections that took place on March 5th 1913. Mapping the place of publication of the newspapers discussing council elections, we show a geographically widespread discussion of local elections (Figure F.2).

Third, we validate our findings qualitatively. Randomly selecting 60 newspapers out of the 1,286 covering elections in March and read through the collected articles. The articles were a mix of opinion pieces on elections, election results and information on where and when to vote in upcoming election. This is consistent with weak campaigning by local councilors. The absence of election ads as such is also consistent with the non-partisan, noncompetitive elections in most cases, especially in rural areas. Mapping the location of all elections covered (approximately 100, with a mix of parish and council elections), we conform that the elections were widespread across the country (Figure F.3).

Figure F.1: Frequency of Election Mentions in Newspapers



Notes: *This figure shows the number of articles on council elections (using the search words 'council' and 'election') found in the British Newspaper Archive database by month between Jan 1st 1912 to September 31st 1914.*

Figure F.2: Mapping the Location of Election Mentions in Newspapers



Notes: *This map shows the publication location of articles on council elections (using the search words 'council' and 'election') found in the British Newspaper Archive database by month between Jan 1st 1912 to September 31st 1914.*

Figure F.3: Mapping the Location of Election Mentions in Newspapers; Random Sample



Notes: *This map shows the publication location of 60 randomly selected articles on council elections (using the search words 'council' and 'election') that took place in March 1913, as found in the British Newspaper Archive database.*

G Robustness Checks

G.1 Outcome Variable

Table G.1: Interaction with High Share of Female Celibacy

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	−0.002	−0.004	−0.011	−0.006	−0.005
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
DPost X March X High Female Celibacy	0.024*	0.026**	0.033***	0.028**	0.028***
	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)
DPost	0.003	0.154	0.176	0.271	−0.461
	(0.003)	(0.402)	(0.461)	(0.483)	(0.737)
March	−0.023	−0.033**	−0.026*	−0.031**	−0.028*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)
High Single Female Share	0.045***	0.005	0.012	0.006	0.008
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,916
R^2	0.116	0.255	0.260	0.248	0.283

Notes: * *p<0.10*, ** *p<0.05*, *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the total number of registered electors. High Female Celibacy and High Class is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the locality has a share of female celibacy (which excludes widows) above the sample median.*

Table G.2: Interaction with High Share of Female Celibacy and High Share of High Class

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.003	−0.001	−0.006	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
DPost X March X High Female Celibacy and High Class	0.019	0.026***	0.030***	0.028**	0.027***
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)
DPost	0.000	0.160	0.225	0.255	−0.364
	(0.005)	(0.379)	(0.406)	(0.461)	(0.723)
March	−0.031**	−0.028**	−0.022	−0.026*	−0.023*
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.013)
High Female Celibacy	0.022**	−0.006	−0.004	−0.004	−0.012*
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,916
R^2	0.061	0.251	0.259	0.245	0.284

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the total number of registered electors. High Female Celibacy and High Class is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the locality has a share of female celibacy (which excludes widows) and a share of high class households that are both above the sample median*

Table G.3: Interaction with High Share of Single Person Households

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.003	0.001	−0.000	0.002	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
DPost X March X High Single HH Share	0.029***	0.033***	0.033***	0.032***	0.034***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
DPost	−0.001	0.096	0.256	0.238	−0.500
	(0.005)	(0.505)	(0.548)	(0.578)	(0.779)
March	−0.010	−0.015	−0.014	−0.016	−0.012
	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
High Single HH Share	0.026***	0.019**	0.017**	0.019**	0.016**
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,916
R^2	0.070	0.256	0.261	0.248	0.285

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the total number of registered electors. High Single HH Share ais defined as a binary variable equal to one if the locality has a share of single households above the sample median.*

Table G.4: Interaction with High Share of Single Person Households and High Share of High Class

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.005	0.004	0.001	0.003	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
DPost X March X High Single HH Share and High Class	0.029***	0.035***	0.038***	0.038***	0.034***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
DPost	−0.001	−0.053	−0.015	−0.058	−0.453
	(0.005)	(0.403)	(0.438)	(0.490)	(0.674)
March	−0.014	−0.017*	−0.014*	−0.016*	−0.014*
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
High Single HH Share and High Class	0.015*	0.009	0.010	0.013	0.000
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,494	3,488	1,766	2,713	2,916
R^2	0.054	0.252	0.259	0.246	0.282

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. Standard errors are clustered at the division level. The outcome variable is the total number of registered electors. High Single HH Share is defined as a binary variable equal to one if the locality has a share of single households and a share of high class households that are both above the sample median.*

G.2 Specification

Table G.5: Unit Fixed Effects

	Share of Local Electors			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DPost X March	0.008*	0.007	0.009*	0.008*
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
DPost	0.003**	0.003***	0.002*	0.003**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Parish FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08
Observations	3,494	1,769	2,718	2,916
R^2	0.896	0.951	0.899	0.887

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Regressions include division-level fixed effects.*

Table G.6: Dropping Individual Counties

	Share of Local Electors			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
DPost X March	0.018**	0.012	0.018*	0.010*
	[0.05]	[0.18]	[0.11]	[0.10]
DPost	0.475	0.030	2.797	0.003
	[0.31]	[0.95]	[0.18]	[0.12]
March	−0.017	−0.027*	−0.037**	−0.013
	[0.12]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.41]
County Dropped	GLO	NFK	SUR	WRY
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.06
Observations	3016	2922	3121	1405
R^2	0.257	0.305	0.251	0.278

Notes: * *p<0.10*, ** *p<0.05*, *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Wild cluster bootstrap with parliamentary divisions as clusters is used to estimate p-values (9999 bootstrap iterations), bootstrapped p-values are reported in square brackets. Dropping individual counties decreases the number of clusters, pushing the number under the minimum rule of thumb of 30. Wild Cluster Bootstrap helps diminish the risk of small cluster number bias.*

G.3 Standard Errors

Table G.7: Wild Cluster Bootstrap

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.014^{**}	0.015^{*}	0.013	0.015^{*}	0.015^{**}
	[0.04]	[0.07]	[0.11]	[0.06]	[0.05]
DPost	-0.002	0.203	0.32	0.341	-0.412
	[0.92]	[0.66]	[0.51]	[0.52]	[0.59]
March	-0.02	-0.025^{**}	-0.023^{*}	-0.025^{**}	-0.018
	[0.12]	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.05]	[0.11]
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.08
Observations	3494	3488	1766	2713	2918
R^2	0.048	0.257	0.263	0.25	0.284

Notes: * *p<0.10,* ** *p<0.05,* *** *p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Wild cluster bootstrap with parliamentary divisions as clusters is used to estimate p-values* (*9999 bootstrap iterations*)*, bootstrapped* p*-values are reported in square brackets.*

Figure G.1: Different Cluster Sizes

(a) Baseline Regression with Different Grid Sizes for Clustering Standard Errors





(b) Number of Clusters



Notes: *Figure G.1a shows the OLS estimates of the baseline regression as a function of the size of the grid used to cluster standard errors. The grid is a fishnet of varying size, from* $0.1° \times 0.1°$ *to* $1° \times 1°$*. The default size throughout the paper is* $0.1° \times 0.1°$*. The vertical bars represent the 95% and 90% confidence intervals. The six specifications are also described in the text and in Table 3.*

Table G.8: Standard Errors Clustered at the Treatment Level

	Share of Local Electors				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DPost X March	0.017**	0.017***	0.015**	0.017**	0.017***
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
DPost	−0.001	0.153	0.276	0.304	−0.493
	(0.002)	(0.421)	(0.504)	(0.515)	(0.552)
March	−0.019*	−0.024**	−0.022**	−0.025**	−0.016*
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)
County FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incl. 1913	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Incl. 1911	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pop under 15k	No	No	No	No	Yes
Within 2 km of roads	No	No	No	No	Yes
Mean dep. var.	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Sd dep. var.	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	3,348	3,342	1,692	2,602	2,604
R^2	0.052	0.275	0.276	0.270	0.321

Notes: * *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The Table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is polling division. The outcome variable is the share of local electors over the total electors registered. Standard Errors are clustered at the treatment × county level.*

H References to Newspaper Articles

1. Irish Citizen, The Woman's Pilgrimage, July 26, 1913

2. Oxford Chronicle, The Women's Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913

3. Common Cause, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913; Common Cause, Special Pilgrimage Number, July 11, 1913; Common Cause, Last Days of the Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Tonbridge Free Press, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 15, 1913

4. Evening Irish Times, The Non-Militant Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913

5. Staffordshire Sentinel, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 28, 1913

6. Chelmsford Chronicle, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 25, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913

7. Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913; Cambridge Independent Press, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913; Reading Standard, Land's End to London, July 26, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 9, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 16, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 23, 1913

8. Hampshire Observer, The New Pilgrimage, July 26, 1913

9. Staffordshire Sentinel, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 12, 1913

10. Reading Standard, Land's End to London, July 26, 1913; Wells Journal, Women's Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 18, 1913; Windsor and Eton Express, The Women's Pilgrimage in Berkshire, July 26, 1913; Maidenhead Advertiser, The Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 23, 1913

11. Common Cause, Last Days of the Pilgrimage, July 25, 1913

12. South Bucks Standard, Suffrage Pilgrimage, July 24, 1913; Reading Standard, Land's End to London, July 26, 1913

I Appendix References

Bennett, Robert J. 2012. Urban Population Database, 1801-1911, Database, Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor].

Heater, Derek Benjamin. 2006. Citizenship in Britain: A history. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hollis, Patricia. 1987. Ladies Elect: Women in English Local Government, 1865-1914. Oxford Clarendon: Oxford University Press.

Richardson, Sarah. 2013. "Petticoat Politicians: Women and the Politics of the Parish in England." Historian (119):12.

Wright, Tony. 2002. The British Political Process. Routledge.